This part of Africa is playing an increasingly important role in the context of the war in Iran. For whoever controls the ports in Somalia and Somaliland controls the ‘Gate of Tears’, the Bab-al-Mandab Strait – the alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.
On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first UN member state to officially recognise Somaliland’s independence. This significant decision has fundamentally altered the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and has led Somalia and numerous international organisations to take action against it. Two powerful, competing geopolitical blocs have formed over the construction and expansion of the strategic port of Berbera in Somaliland
[1] The pro-Somaliland bloc. Alongside Hargeysa (the capital of Somaliland) stands a coalition of states that are investing in port infrastructure, seeking access to the sea, or striving for military control over the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait:
[a] United Arab Emirates: The key financial and logistical driver. The UAE’s state-owned logistics giant – DP World – operates the port of Berber, has invested millions of dollars in its modernisation and is reaping ever-greater profits from it. The UAE regards this region as its key geopolitical and logistical base for extending its influence deeper into Africa and exploiting the resources of the African continent (including through its support for the paramilitary group RSF in Sudan).
[b] Ethiopia: A country with a population of over 120 million, which lost its access to the sea following its separation from Eritrea. In return for a promise to recognise Somaliland’s independence, Addis Ababa signed a lease agreement for 20 km of coastline around Berbera, with a view to building its own commercial port and a naval base. For Ethiopia, this is a matter of vital independence from the port in Djibouti.
[c] Israel wants to establish an intelligence and military base right in the Gulf of Aden in order to monitor naval movements, counter attacks by the Yemeni Houthis and limit Iran’s influence.
[d] Taiwan: Maintains close diplomatic ties with Somaliland (neither state enjoys full international recognition) and provides technological support to Hargeysa.
[2] The Pro-Somalia bloc (Mogadishu Coalition). Standing alongside the Federal Government in Mogadishu (Somalia) are states that oppose the violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity, as well as the regional rivals of the UAE and Ethiopia:
[a] Egypt: Somalia’s most vocal and resolute ally. Cairo regards Ethiopia’s plans to build a naval base as a direct threat to its national security. Egypt is already embroiled in a deep-seated conflict with Ethiopia over the waters of the Nile (the Grand Dam) – and now fears that Ethiopian warships could undermine Egyptian dominance in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. In early 2026, Egypt deployed more than 1,000 soldiers to Somalia and stepped up military cooperation with Mogadishu.
[b] Turkey: Somalia’s most important military and economic partner for more than a decade. Ankara operates the largest foreign military base in Mogadishu, trains the Somali army and has signed an agreement to defend Somalia’s territorial waters. Turkey defends Somalia’s sovereignty, as the destabilisation of the country would jeopardise its substantial investments there.
[c] Saudi Arabia: Riyadh is strongly opposed to the destruction of Somalia. The Saudis are competing with the UAE for influence in the Arab world and in the Red Sea; for this reason, they signed a military cooperation agreement with Somalia in February 2026 to counter the influence of the former bloc.
[d] Qatar, Iran and the Yemeni Houthis: Qatar provides financial support to the administration in Mogadishu (in opposition to the UAE). Iran opposes Israel’s presence in this region, and the Houthi rebels have officially declared that the infrastructure in Somaliland (including the port) will be their military target should Israeli forces appear there.
It is a high-stakes game in which the outcome will determine whether the Berbera port becomes an autonomous gateway to the world for Ethiopia and a base for Israel and the UAE, or whether Mogadishu – with the help of the Egyptian and Turkish military – can block these plans by invoking international law and the inviolability of borders. It is also a matter of survival for Djibouti, the tiny country in the Horn of Africa that depends entirely on its port and for which the expansion of the port in Berbera would spell disaster. The next war could therefore break out in this very region of the world.
