Slovakia is a small country in Central Europe. Between the First and Second World Wars, and later from the end of World War II until the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, it was part of Czechoslovakia. Its pre-war population stood at just two and a half million – roughly the population of each Baltic state taken separately. Historically, separate political tendencies always existed among the Slovak elites. Not all of them wanted to be coupled with Czechia, nor did they all wish to belong to Czechoslovakia—even though, for a nation as small as the Slovaks, forming a single state with the equally small Czech nation was highly advantageous. This bond was further reinforced by their languages, which are essentially two sides of the same coin: entirely mutually comprehensible.
As the political situation deteriorated in the 1930s—with Berlin pursuing an increasingly aggressive policy against Prague—the Czechoslovak state disintegrated. Czechia was occupied by the Third Reich, while Slovakia declared independence. However, while Slovakia became a separate state, it was by no means sovereign. It was too small, too weak, and too insignificant to even dream of genuine sovereignty. For all practical purposes, Slovakia was a creation of Berlin. It was Berlin that held the reins of power, not the Slovak capital of Bratislava. To make matters more complex, this small, landlocked Central European state was not ethnically homogeneous. It contained both German and Hungarian minorities. The former acted as the eyes and ears of Berlin, while the latter, settled along the southern border, provided a constant pretext for Budapest to intervene in Slovakia’s internal affairs.
This chapter of Slovak history closely resembles the 20th-century trajectory of three other small European nations: the Baltic states. Throughout the last century, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia consecutively experienced a similar cycle to Slovakia: life within a larger empire, a period of independence, reabsorption into a larger entity, and a subsequent return to independence. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Baltic states were parts of the Russian Empire. Between the World Wars, they enjoyed independence. Following World War II and until the end of the Cold War, they were incorporated into the Soviet Union as Soviet republics. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have once again been independent—or at least, nominally so.
Nominally, because they are simply too small to act as truly independent, sovereign actors on the global stage. Today, all three are members of both the European Union and NATO—two facts that illuminate the true nature of their political standing. Just as Slovakia was controlled by Berlin during the Second World War, the Baltic states are effectively directed by Berlin (often operating under the name of Brussels) today, with all the attending consequences. Furthermore, just as wartime Slovakia grappled with significant German and Hungarian minorities, the Baltic states today contain a sizable ethnic minority of their own: Russians.
During the Second World War, this “independent” Slovak state joined the Third Reich and the rest of Axis Europe in their crusade against the Soviet Union. Slovakia formed a few military divisions and sent its young men deep into Soviet territory—so far, in fact, that Slovak soldiers ended up fighting at the foot of the Caucasus Mountains.

Pause for a moment and consider the reality of that situation: a nation of two and a half million people took part in a war against a nation of nearly 200 million, sending its soldiers to pursue military objectives thousands of kilometres from home. If you draw a straight line on a map from Bratislava to the Caucasus, the distance is staggering. How did the Slovak leadership justify this to its population? The wartime rhetoric claimed that Slovak soldiers were defending the “common European home” against outside forces. But what did ordinary Slovaks actually think about their small nation’s participation in Europe’s grand war against the Soviet Union? They kept asking themselves a single, simple question: What business do we have at the foot of the Caucasus?
Today’s leaders in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia appear to be walking in the footsteps of wartime Slovakia. Representing tiny nations, they nevertheless employ highly bellicose language and are routinely the first to throw down the gauntlet to mighty Russia. If ordered by Berlin, they too would readily dispatch their small armed forces to—where? The Caucasus again? The Urals? The Caspian Sea? Just like their Slovak predecessors, modern Baltic leaders rely on the rhetoric of defending not only their own borders, but the whole of Europe against Russian imperialism. In reality, these small nations are flexing their muscles only because they have a “Big Brother” backing them up—or, more accurately, because that Big Brother is constantly pitting them against their powerful neighbour.
As history shows, European campaigns against Russia follow a predictable pattern: they begin with a measure of success, degenerate into grinding wars of attrition, and eventually turn sour. Whether led by Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon Bonaparte of France, or Adolf Hitler of Germany, Western forces have historically sustained inevitable defeats. Forced to beat a hasty retreat, they invariably abandon the minor nations they dragged into the crusade. Left to their own devices and routinely betrayed by yesterday’s allies, these small states find themselves compelled to negotiate a modus vivendi with Russia.
Of course, negotiation is exactly what these nations should have done in the first place, without seeking the approval of their patrons in the West. State leaders must know history, and their brains must be guided by common sense. They must recognize the geopolitical truth that neighbours are given by God. A nation cannot choose or change its geography; it is destined to live alongside its neighbours forever. Consequently, it is infinitely more reasonable to seek avenues of cooperation with a powerful neighbour rather than alienating him and turning him into an enemy. Neighbours stay exactly where they are, while alliances have a peculiar tendency to dissolve the moment circumstances get difficult. This is doubly true for alliances between great powers and minor states: such partnerships are unequal and treacherous by definition.
What was the ultimate price of Slovakia’s participation in the invasion of the Soviet Union? History remembers. Germany was crushed, and Slovakia spent the next four decades dominated by the Soviet Union. What political fate can the Baltic states expect when Russia, sooner or later, prevails over the West in the current conflict?
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Notes for Younger Readers
[1] Czechoslovakia. A state of the Czechs and Slovaks formed in 1918 from the ruins of Austria-Hungary. It disintegrated in 1938–39: the Sudetenland was annexed by Germany, the Czech lands became the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,” and Slovakia declared independence under German protection. Reunited in 1945, it was peacefully divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Czech and Slovak are so closely related that speakers can understand one another without translation.
[2] Slovak State, 1939–1945. Formally independent under President Jozef Tiso (a Catholic priest), but in reality a satellite of the Third Reich. It participated in the war against the Soviet Union; Slovak units fought in the Caucasus, among other places. After 1945, Slovakia became part of Czechoslovakia again and remained within the Soviet sphere of influence until 1989.
[3] Baltic States: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Part of the Russian Empire until 1918; independent from 1918 to 1940; annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940; under German occupation from 1941 to 1944; thereafter Soviet republics again; independent since 1991. All three are members of the EU and NATO (2004). They have significant Russian-speaking minorities, particularly in Latvia and Estonia.
[4] Charles XII, Napoleon, Hitler. Three European campaigns against Russia that failed: King Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava in 1709, Napoleon during his retreat from Moscow in 1812, and Hitler after his defeats at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk in 1941–1943. The text draws the lesson from this that small allies are ultimately left to fend for themselves.
[5] Modus vivendi. Latin: a way of living together. Here: a practical understanding with a powerful neighbor, without friendship and without war.