At the peak of its development, the Roman Empire ruled over all the countries that were located around the Mediterranean. Carthage had been destroyed, Greece had been subjugated, even Egypt had been conquered. Gaul and Spain had been turned into Roman provinces as were the coastal regions of the Adriatic Sea. Hence the proud Romans could declare that all the waters in between Europe and Africa and Asia were Mare Nostrum or Our Sea. All merchantmen were controlled by Rome as were all the ports. No one could travel freely without Rome’s permission. The Romans did not need to bother about tolls or tariffs or whatever. (Sometimes they were bothered by pirates, but that problem would be swiftly solved by Rome’s military might.)
The Baltic Sea is five times smaller than the Mediterranean (approximately 0.5 million square kilometres against 2.5 million square kilometres), but it is an important and – in many cases – the only sea route for many European countries to the high seas, to the Atlantic Ocean. These countries include (clockwise, starting from the north) Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia again (the Kaliningrad oblast), Poland, Germany, and Denmark. Since Sweden and Finland have recently joined NATO, the Baltic Sea had become a sea that is surrounded by NATO member countries with the exception of Russia. But Russia has a very narrow access through the Finnish Gulf (that’s where St Petersburg is located) and through the Kaliningrad oblast, which in turn is cut off from Russia proper by territories that belong to Poland and Lithuania. Having in mind the two narrow slips of land where Russia has access to the Baltic Sea, we can say that the Baltic has become NATO’s Mare Nostrum.
Considering the enmity that reigns supreme between the Western bloc and the Russian Federation, we can easily imagine the temptation on the part of the Western countries to view the Baltic Sea as a stranglehold on Russia. The leaders of these countries might choose to block Russia from sending its ships via the Baltic to the Atlantic Ocean or they might at least want to make life miserable for the Russian fleet. Let us not forget that Russia might access the Atlantic Ocean also through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, but then, again, the access looks like a narrow throttle – especially in the place called the Bosporus Straight. It is controlled by Turkey, and although the 1936 Montreux Convention makes the Straight passable internationally, Turkey is a NATO member.
As it is, Russia can easily be cut off from the Atlantic Ocean irrespective of whether she chooses to access the ocean through the Baltic or through the Black and the Mediterranean Seas. Yet, being a nuclear superpower and finding itself in a mortal struggle with the West for sheer survival as an independent, sovereign state, the Russian Federation might be compelled to (aggressive? defensive? pre-emptive?) measures. Recall how the so-called Polish Corridor – a strip of land that cut off East Prussia from Germany proper during the time of 1918-1939 sparked the war between Germany and Poland, and consequently the Second World War. At that time Germany did not fight for its survival, certainly not against Poland, which did not threaten Germany’s existence, and still Berlin decided that Germany could not do without the corridor. Now Russia as a superpower needs access to the high seas or else. The Russian Federation is the largest country by territory, but its location is somewhat infelicitous. While the United States has unrestricted access to both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, Russia only has direct access to the Pacific Ocean. The problem is that while the United States’ eastern and western seaboards are equally well economically developed, Russia’s far east is not. The other point is that Russia’s far east is far flung from the European part of Russia. The distance between the western- and easternmost parts of the Russian Federation is much longer than that between America’s western and eastern seaboard. Moscow must, therefore, fight for access to the high seas cost it what it may. What may we expect?
If any one or all of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) choose to alienate Russia, to deny its access to the Baltic, then they might fall prey to Russia’s military intervention. Will the said Baltic states risk such policy? In all probability, they will. Why? Because already we can see how bellicose they are in their dealings with the Russian Federation, and how their leaders bend over backwards to oblige their Western overlords. They might choose to take over the role which has been played by Ukraine for the last several years. Taking such steps, they will force Russia to step in militarily. Once Russia intervenes in the Baltic states, she might choose to either incorporate them, or install there governments that will be Russia friendly. Bear in mind that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia used to be parts of imperial Russia (where they had no autonomy) and then of the Soviet Union (where they enjoyed the status of union republics with their governments, constitutions and the like; a status similar to that that they have now within the framework of the European Union).
If Finland chooses to thwart Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, it might expose itself to a repeat of the Winter War of 30 November 1939 – 13 March 1940. That war cost it territorial losses. Finland, too, used to be part of the Russian empire as an autonomous grand duchy (1809-1917) with its own parliament. If push comes to shove, Finland may again lose some of its territory or become an autonomous part of the Russian Federation.
I hear you say NATO will never allow that kind of land grab! If you think so, then, please, think again. If the scenario that we are presenting materializes, the ruling classes of the Baltic states and Finland will swiftly and comfortably run away (that’s the usual behaviour of the ruling classes), while the common Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Finns will remain, as is usually the case with the common people.
The Baltic as Mare Nostrum is a powerful geostrategic instrument in the hands of the managers of the Western world, but concurrently – a curse for the common people of small nations who matter to the managers of the world about as much as the pawns on the chessboard.
